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Abstract
Ramsey pricing has been proposed in the pharmaceutical industry as a
principle to price discriminate among markets while allowing to recover the
(fixed) R&D cost. However, such analyses neglect the presence of insurance
or the fund raising costs for drug reimbursement. By incorporating these new
elements, we aim at providing some building blocks towards an economic
theory merging Ramsey pricing, equity concerns by governments and the
strategic incentives, as governments also determine the reimbursement level
in countries with a NHS-like system. This will have important implications
to the application of Ramsey pricing principles to pharmaceutical products
across countries.
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1 Introduction.
An old debate being developed since the late 1950s, concerns the link between the
level of profits of a company (and thus, its monopoly power in the market) and the
source of funding of R&D activities. The recent years have witnessed the uprising
of the globalization of economic activities in the developed world. Together with
globalization, increasing costs associated with the pace of technological change
force companies to review their R&D organization and spending. DiMasi et al.
(2003) estimate the total R&D cost per new drug in 2001 at $802 million.1 The
Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development (2003), increases the estimate
further to $897 million in 2003. Domı´nguez et al. (2005) argue that in recent years
pharmaceutical companies have oriented their R&D efforts towards small innova-
tions rather that more drastic (and risky) ones. Two reasons justify such behavior.
First, the lack of demand sensitivity to price changes induced by insurance; and
second, the fact that small innovations are more profitable than large ones as they
are directed to the more inelastic part of the demand. In a complementary view,
Pavcnik (2002) finds that pharmaceutical corporations pricing policies are sensi-
tive to the patient out-of-pocket expenses. In particular, prices are lower the more
exposed are patients to prices. Zeller (2004) looks at the role of R&D strategies of
multinatioanl pharmaceutical companies to conclude that those companies embed
in knowledge-rich regions thus reinforcing a “pharmabiotech spider’s web econ-
omy”.
The sharp increase in R&D expenses combines in the case of the pharmaceu-
tical industry, with the traditional differences of drug prices across countries due
to a number of factors. Among them, different regulatory regimes and insurance
systems, together with the fact that governments are usually monopsony buyers of
drugs.
In reply to this new environment, companies have reacted developing partner-
ships as a way to cope with (i) the rising cost and risk of R&D activities, (ii) the
appropriation of the full array of applications to capture a greater return on tech-
1See Frank (2003) for an assessment on how to interpret this estimation.
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nology investment, (iii) the bridging of the gap between technology creators and
technology users, and (iv) the complex and multidisciplinary new technologies.
Partnerships arise in many forms: among companies, between companies and re-
search universities, as strategic alliances within a supply chain, and, of course,
partnerships with governments.
On their part, governments in high price countries have also reacted by intro-
ducing these prices differences as an element in their negotiations with pharma-
ceutical corporations in the so-called reference pricing system and/or allowing for
parallel imports under the argument that trade normally increases consumer wel-
fare. Danzon (no date) argues against these practices as they are harmful to R&D
efforts. Her argument relies on two facts. On the one hand, R&D is a fixed cost
once the new product is developed, and on the other hand, “(...) as R&D costs can-
not be rationally allocated as a direct cost of serving a specific country or consumer
group, there is a strong incentive for each country to free-ride, leaving others to pay
for the joint R&D costs.” To complicate matters, R&D costs are difficult to track
because they span over a period of 15 to 20 years (see Toole, 2005), and include
many failed attempts, so that defining a sharing rule to allocate the joint R&D costs
is not an easy task.
Firms, in turn, aim at setting a single price. At least within the European Union
such an objective is often found. According to Danzon and Towse (2003) external
referencing and parallel trade lie at the heart of this objective.2 Danzon (no date)
stresses the fallacy of uniform prices associated to parallel imports and external
referencing: if all consumers face the same high price, then low income countries
will be unable to afford innovative medicines. But if everyone pays the same low
price, “(...) in the long run, consumers will be deprived of innovative drugs that
they would have been willing to pay for, had differential pricing been permitted.”
In this line, Maynard and Bloor (2003) conclude that price controls must be sup-
plemented with volume controls to constrain overall spending.
We propose to focus on the issue of how to impute the overall R&D costs
2External referencing occurs whenever a country uses (low) prices in other countries to regulate
prices at home.
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in the pharmaceutical industry across countries in the presence of insurance. We
depart from Danzon and Towse (2003) who propose to use the principle of Ramsey
pricing to define the price differentials across markets to cover the (fixed) R&D
costs. Their main concern is to have richer countries paying enough to allow for
the recovery of R&D costs associated with new drugs, while keeping prices low in
developing countries, to ensure wide access to pharmaceuticals. Direct application
of Ramsey pricing principles lead to this sort of differential pricing rules as long as
consumers in low-income countries have a more price-elastic demand.
This is a controversial issue because, Ramsey (discriminatory) prices assume
firms obtaining “normal” profit returns, allowing for recovering fixed costs. This
contrasts with the periodic announcements by pharmaceutical corporations of profit
returns far beyond normal levels. Love (2001) or Raghavan (2001) are examples
of the critical view of the use of Ramsey prices, as regulators look at the price dis-
crimination argument but forget about the budget constraint. In contrast, Scherer
(2001) assesses the evidence on the link between profits and R&D effort in the US
pharmaceutical industry. He concludes that “(...) as profit opportunities expand,
firms compete to exploit them by increasing investments, primarily in R&D, until
the increases in costs dissipates most, if not all, supranormal profit returns.” Also
Danzon and Towse (2003) argue in favor of Ramsey prices as ”(...) in the long
run with unrestricted entry and exit of firms offering competing but differentiated
products, dynamic competition will reduce expected profits to normal levels at the
margin.” Besides, Ramsey pricing assumes that the social value of an extra dollar
of consumption of an individual is the same across markets. In western economies
this may not be a difficulty, but when different markets are located in developed
and developing countries, such an assumption is hard to maintain. To overcome
this difficulty, Diamond (1975) proposed the so-called many-person Ramsey rule
as a generalization of the Ramsey pricing to allow for distributional concerns. Jack
and Lanjouw (2003) apply this generalized rule to the cost-sharing of pharmaceu-
tical innovation in an international context where world income distribution is used
to adjust international pharmaceutical prices. They conclude that (i) with those ad-
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justments, poor countries should not necessarily share in any of the costs of R&D,
and (ii) the pricing structure is not related to that which would be chosen by a
monopolist in a simple (proportional) way.
The argument for sustaining price differentials is reinforced by the simulation
study of Dumonliu (2001), where access to pharmaceuticals would be seriously
impeded under a global uniform price. Felder (2004, 2006) studies the welfare ef-
fects of different pricing policies (uniform prices, two-part tariffs, and third-degree
discriminatory prices) under monopoly and moral hazard.
Although these authors and others, emphasize the welfare enhancement from
price discrimination across countries, arguing for higher prices in richer countries,
we believe they miss a central ingredient. Even if we take price elasticities of
demand to be higher in low income countries, the analysis neglects the role of in-
surance. Actually, Danzon and Towse (2003) do comment on the role of insurance
in making demand faced by pharmaceuticals to be more or less price sensitive.
However, they do not investigate further the changes in the Ramsey pricing rule
that result from differences between the price paid by consumers (net of insurance)
and the value received by the firm.
To see intuitively why the level of insurance makes a difference, consider two
markets (countries) with the same (constant) price elasticity of demand but distinct
insurance levels. For the sake of the argument, assume that in one country there is
no insurance while in the other there is full insurance. Efficient pricing a` la Ramsey
determines a higher price in the country that distorts less the quantity consumed.
This means that the country where full insurance prevails should pay all the R&D
costs, since no distortion in consumption seems to result. Besley (1998) finds that
the design of optimal (second-best) insurance policies is driven by the trade-off
between the economic losses from moral hazrd and the gains from risk sharing.
This, some would say, just acknowledges that price elasticity of demand does
still matter. However, this simple intuition fails to take into account an additional
aspect. Because insurance exists (and indeed full insurance was assumed) in one
country, that country will have the usual moral hazard problem of excessive con-
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sumption (as the price faced by consumers at the moment of consumption is zero).
Therefore, a benevolent planner, as implied by the Ramsey optimal pricing prob-
lem, will actually want to take this into account. Naturally, under full insurance
nothing can be done, but under less than full insurance, the social planner may want
to increase more the price in the market with higher co-insurance rate to counter-
act on the moral hazard effect. In addition, since there is some extra consumption
under more insurance, the financing constraint is less binding than otherwise, al-
lowing for a lower price in the country with a less generous welfare policy. The
price setting problem will make a balance between the distortions needed to allow
for recovery of the fixed cost and the compensation of the moral hazard effect. To-
gether with the moral hazard problem generated by insurance, the way countries
define copayments has to take into account the equity and access issues underlying
the design of differential prices.
In terms of discussion of high prices in rich countries/low prices in poor coun-
tries, as long as insurance coverage is more generous in richer countries, our point
reinforces the efficiency argument for international pricing differentials. Our con-
tribution in this literature is to provide some building blocks towards an economic
theory merging Ramsey pricing, equity concerns by governments and the strate-
gic incentives, as governments also determine the reimbursement level in countries
with a NHS-like system. Of course, what arrangement be actually implemented
influences the incentives of firms to perform R&D. The paper is organized in the
following way: next section presents the basic model and the intuition of how Ram-
sey prices are distorted by the presence of two coinsurance schemes (copayment
and reference prices). Section 3 provides a more general characterization allowing
for a comparison of the two coinsurance policies. A section with a discussion of
the analysis and its implications closes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a set I of countries where a pharmaceutical company sells a (patented)
drug. We assume, for simplicity, that countries are identical and that individuals
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within each country are also identical and summarized by a representative con-
sumer.
Health care insurance reimbursement schemes are typically based either on a
copayment rate or on a reference price. Let pi be the price of a particular drug in
country i. A copayment rate si ∈ [0, 1] in country i means that the insurer bears
a proportion sipi of the cost of the health care treatment, and the patient pays the
remaining amount (1 − si)pi. A reference price p̂i in country i is defined as the
price level above which the patient is fully responsible for the payment. For prices
below the reference price, the insurer bears the cost of the health care provided.
In general, the price paid by the patient in country i, pci , is given by
pci = pi − pi(pi), with pi(pi) = (1− δ)pˆi + δsipi (1)
where pi is the coinsurance in case of need of medical care. For δ = 1 we obtain
the copayment setting while for δ = 0 the reference pricing scheme arises. Values
of δ ∈ (0, 1) define mixed systems.
Let Di(pci ) be the demand for the relevant drug in country i ∈ I . The pharma-
ceutical company has to recover R&D costs, given by F , and has production costs
given by a constant marginal cost c. We assume the existence of a supra-national
entity that will define prices as to maximize social welfare over a set I of countries.
All countries are valued equally.
From the point of view of the supra-national entity, the problem of determi-
nation of optimal prices, while recovering the cost of research and development
expenditures, takes into account consumers’ surplus, producers’ surplus, and the
payments made for drug reimbursement. This last element, introduces a public
funds distortion cost in the case of a public insurer, or the insurance loading in the
case of private insurance companies. We denote such distortion cost of funds by η.
Thus, the social welfare function can be written as
W =
∑
i∈I
(∫ ∞
pci
Di(p)dp− (1 + η)sipiDi(pci ) + (pi − ci)D(pci )
)
− F (2)
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2.1 Copayment
The consumer’s price at the moment of consumption/health need is net of any
insurance the consumer may have:
pci = pi(1− si), (3)
where si is the co-insurance rate and pi the price received by the pharmaceutical
company, as described above (δ = 1).
The pharmaceutical company has to recover R&D costs, given by F , and has
production costs given by a constant marginal cost c.
We assume the existence of a supra-national entity that will define prices as to
maximize social welfare. All countries are valued equally.
From the point of view of the supra-national entity, the problem of determi-
nation of optimal prices, while recovering the cost of research and development
expenditures, is given by
max
{pi}
W =
∑
i∈I
(∫ ∞
pci
Di(p)dp− (1 + η)sipiDi(pci ) + (pi − ci)Di(pci )
)
− F
(4)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
(pi − ci)Di(pci )− F = 0.
The first-order conditions of this problem are:
∂L
∂pi
= −Di(pci )(1 + siη)− si(1− si)(1 + η)pi
∂Di
∂pci
+
+ (1 + λ)
[
Di(pci ) + (pi − ci)(1− si)
∂Di
∂pci
]
= 0, i ∈ I (5)
∂L
∂λ
=
∑
i∈I
(pi − ci)Di(pci )− F = 0 (6)
Rearranging the first-order conditions, we can write
pi − ci
pi
=
λ
1 + λ
1
εi
+
si
1 + λ
κi, κi ≡ 1− η
(
1− εi
εi
)
(7)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the zero-profit constraint, and
εi = −∂D/∂p× p/D denotes demand elasticity.
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The introduction of the distortion cost η has an upper bound smaller than one.
Most estimates put this value in a range around 0.2.3 Also, the presence of insur-
ance is likely to make demand inelastic with values in co-insurance contexts around
0.2 (Newhouse, 1993; Ringel et al, 2005). For those values κi takes positive values.
Thus, heretofore, we will assume κi > 0.
The equilibrium pricing rule obtained differs from the standard Ramsey pricing
rule in the last term: for equal demand elasticities, Lagrange multiplier, and given
distortion cost of funds, a country with a higher co-insurance rate will have a higher
price as well. This is due to the well-known ex-post moral hazard problem of health
insurance. Since insurance implies a lower price at the moment of consumption,
consumers tend to overspend, in the sense of marginal benefit being smaller than
social marginal cost at the equilibrium. This effect is larger the higher the co-
insurance rate, which motivates a higher pi as to partially correct it.
This additional motive for price differentials may, or may not, reinforce price
dispersion across countries. Whenever on top of lower price elasticity of demand,
richer countries also have a higher insurance coverage, then they should face higher
prices than low-income countries for efficiency reasons alone.
This result also implies that assessment of international price dispersion cannot
be made on the basis of marginal cost and price elasticity of demand differences.
One must also look at co-insurance rate variations.
It is also noteworthy that Ramsey pricing is still not supportive of a policy of
uniform prices across countries. It may accidentally occur that εi and si are such
that price-cost margins are equal across countries, but a small perturbation in the
fixed cost F would destroy such uniform prices.
The existence of insurance has actually another indirect effect. Holding mill
prices constant, increasing the co-insurance rate means more revenues to the com-
pany as consumption expands. This helps to finance the fixed costs. Therefore, λ
also varies, in equilibrium, with exogenous shifts in the co-insurance rate.
The comparison of prices for distinct levels of the co-insurance rate cannot be
3For more details, see, inter alia, Allgood and Snow (2006) and Fullerton (1991).
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fully assessed from the mere statement of first-order conditions. A full comparative
statics exercise must be performed, which we report below for the two-country
case.
2.1.1 Comparative statics in a two-country market
Assume that we have two countries, I = {1, 2}. Total differentiation of first-order
conditions yields, for a change in s1,
∂2L
∂p21
dp1 +
∂2L
∂p1∂λ
dλ+
∂2L
∂p1∂s1
ds1 = 0, (8)
∂2L
∂p22
dp2 +
∂2L
∂p2∂λ
dλ = 0, (9)
∂2L
∂λ∂p1
dp1 +
∂2L
∂λ∂p2
dp2 = 0, (10)
where L denotes the Lagrangian function of the optimization problem.
We solve this system for dpi/ds1 and dλ/ds1. The comparative statics exercise
establishes:4
dp1
ds1
≶ 0, dp2
ds1
< 0,
dλ
ds1
< 0. (11)
These results imply the following. An increase in the co-insurance rate in country
1 increases overall consumption and allows to finance more easily the R&D costs
(the amount F ). This alleviates the constraint faced (dλ/ds1 < 0), which in itself
would allow for a reduction of prices in both countries. In country 2 there are no
further effects and an increase in the co-insurance rate in country 1 should decrease
the optimal Ramsey price in country 2 (dp2/ds1 < 0). On country 1, however, an
increase in the co-insurance rate also increases the moral hazard issue (the subsidy
must also be paid, and at the margin consumption occurs where marginal benefit
is already below marginal costs). To control for this, the price in country 1 should
increase. Therefore, in country 1 we have conflicting effects and the equilibrium
price may actually increase or decrease.
4On top of the usual regularity conditions stated previously, we also make use of the assumption
of a concave or not too convex demand function to ensure ∂2L/∂p1∂s1 > 0.
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Finally, it is relevant to note that in our setup the co-insurance rate s1 is overall
welfare decreasing (dL/ds1 < 0), as
∂L
∂s1
= p21
∂D1
∂pc1
λ
ε1
< 0 (12)
where we have made use of (7).
This is not surprising as the co-insurance rate plays only the role of a price
subsidy here. This is so because we have not modeled the costs of bearing risk,
and the welfare gains of insurance, which would work in the opposite direction in
what respects the total effect.
2.2 Reference price
A reference price p̂i as defined above means that pci = pi−p̂i. The welfare measure
of the supra-national authority is given by the lagrangian function of the welfare
maximization problem, that is,
max
{pi}
W =
∑
i∈I
(∫ ∞
pci
Di(p)dp− (1 + η)p̂iDi(pci ) + (pi − ci)Di(pci )
)
− F
(13)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
(pi − ci)Di(pci )− F = 0
The corresponding first-order conditions for welfare maximization are
∂L
∂pi
= −Di(pci )− (1 + η)pˆi
∂Di
∂pci
+
+ (1 + λ)
[
Di(pci ) + (pi − ci)
∂Di
∂pci
]
= 0, i ∈ I (14)
∂L
∂λ
=
∑
i∈I
(pi − ci)Di(pci )− F = 0 (15)
From these expressions, we can easily obtain the comparative statics of an increase
in pˆ1 in a two-country world. Similar to what happens with the co-insurance ar-
rangement,
dp1
dp̂1
≶ 0; dp2
dp̂1
< 0;
dλ
dp̂1
< 0 (16)
Therefore, the qualitative effects are the same as under the co-insurance arrange-
ment.
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3 General characterization
The previous sections presented the basic intuition of the additional effects of Ram-
sey pricing introduced by existence of insurance arrangements. We proceed now to
a more general characterization allowing for comparing the two insurance copay-
ment schemes presented.
Let us recall previous notation,
pci = pi − pi(pi), pi(pi) = (1− δ)pˆi + δsipi (17)
To compare both systems note that moving from δ = 0 to δ = 1 we move
from the reference price system to the copayment one. If the infinitesimal changes,
along the path from δ = 0 to δ = 1 keep the same sign effect upon each of the
endogenous variables, the same will be true of the full effect. For this comparison,
we maintain the assumption of two countries.
Total differentiation of the first-order conditions yields, for a change in δ,
∂2L
∂p21
dp1 +
∂2L
∂p1∂λ
dλ = − ∂
2L
∂p2∂δ
dδ (18)
∂2L
∂p22
dp2 +
∂2L
∂p2∂λ
dλ = − ∂
2L
∂p2∂δ
dδ (19)
∂Π
∂p1
dp1 +
∂Π
∂p2
dp2 = −∂Π
∂δ
dδ (20)
given that ∂2L/∂p1∂p2 = 0, ∂2L/∂p1∂λ = ∂2L/∂p2∂λ = ∂Π/∂pi = Πi, and
Π =
∑
i∈I(pi − ci)D(pci )− F .
Solving this system of equations,
dp1
dδ
=
∂Π/∂p2
H
(
∂Π
∂p2
∂L
∂p1
δ − ∂Π
∂p1
∂L
∂p2
δ
)
(21)
dp2
dδ
=
∂Π/∂p1
H
(
∂Π
∂p1
∂L
∂p2
δ − ∂Π
∂p2
∂L
∂p1
δ
)
(22)
dλ
dδ
= −∂Π
∂δ
∂2L
∂p21
∂2L
∂p22
+
∂2L
∂p1∂δ
∂Π
∂p1
+
∂2L
∂p21
∂2L
∂p2∂δ
∂Π
∂p2
(23)
where H denotes the determinant of the corresponding hessian matrix. It is also
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the case that
∂Π
∂δ
=
∑
i∈I
(pi − ci)∂Di
∂pci
(pˆi − sipi) (24)
∂Π
∂pi
= D(pci ) + (pi − ci)
∂Di
∂pci
(1− δsi) > 0 (25)
(if this last inequality does not hold, the monopoly price would prevail).
Starting at δ = 1 (co-insurance regime) and introducing the reference price
equal to the reimbursed value at the equilibrium value of the co-insurance regime,
pˆi = sip∗i one obtains
∂2L
∂pi∂δ
= p∗1si
∂Di
∂pci
(
si − p
∗
i − ci
p∗i
(1 + λ)
)
> 0 (26)
and from the first-order condition the term in parenthesis has negative value, so the
positive value follows. Also, at the same initial point, ∂Π/∂δ = 0, and applying
(26) and (27) into (24) implies
dλ
dδ
< 0 (27)
Thus moving from co-insurance rate to reference pricing increases the financial
constraint - since at the margin the consumer is more sensitive to the price, the
financing of the R&D cost has a higher distortion cost.
The other conclusion is about price movements, as prices will evolve in oppo-
site directions.
3.1 Comparative statics on p
Another issue that can be addressed in our framework is the desirability of having
a co-payment driven by the need to finance the R&D costs, against the alternative
of consumers paying the full price. Taking the welfare function,
W =
∑
i=1,2
(∫ ∞
pci
D(p)dp− p¯iDi(pci ) + (pi − ci)Di(pci )
)
− F (28)
The impact of an exogenous change in the reference price is
dW
dp¯i
= p¯i
∂Di
∂pci
+ (pi − ci)∂Di
∂pci
(
∂pi
∂p¯i
− 1
)
+ (pj − cj)∂Dj
∂pcj
∂pj
∂p¯i
, j 6= i (29)
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Evaluated at p¯i = 0, and given that from the comparative statics results, ∂pi/∂p¯i <
1, ∂pj/∂p¯i < 0, one obtains dW/p¯i > 0. Therefore, for positive R&D costs to
be financed, under the assumption of unitary social cost of funds, it is welfare
improving to have a positive reference price.
We find this result remarkable because, even without considering the welfare
effects of insurance, it turns out that a positive coinsurance to finance a fixed R&D
cost is welfare enhancing.
4 Discussion
Another interesting implication from explicit consideration of the insurance ar-
rangements is that in the presence of such arrangements, price equal to marginal
cost is not optimal even for λ = 0. That is, even if revenues under normal market
conditions are sufficient to cover the R&D costs, it is optimal to have price above
marginal cost.
The comparison across systems is a hard one to perform, as the same revenue
has to be raised in each case. If p¯i = sp∗i , does pi change? To answer this, we need
to look at the first-order conditions of both problems. In any case, increasing one
price means decreasing the other price, given the same R&D costs that need to be
financed. Therefore, a change in the insurance scheme can only imply a realloca-
tion of the financial burden. By comparing the two sets of first-order conditions, it
is easy to see that both are satisfied for the very same prices as long as p¯1 = s1p∗1.
Therefore, the insurance arrangement is irrelevant - reference pricing or rate of
reimbursement yield the same price and allocation of resources.
The analysis has been presented in terms of a representative consumer. Accord-
ingly, there is no room for introducing equity concerns. On the issue the reader is
referred to Jack and Lanjouw (2003). As we have mentioned above, introducing
different populations (countries), lead them to non-proportional pricing schemes
so that poor countries need not share any R&D cost.
We may finally discuss the role of arbitrage across countries. The existence
of arbitrage means one more constraint in the choice problem of the Government,
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which does not improve with respect to its absence. An immediate implication
of perfect arbitrage between countries is that prices will be equal in both coun-
tries, which in turn makes the price to the consumer to be fully determined by the
financial constraint.
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